If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issuance of their currency, first by inflation, and then by deflation, the banks and the corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the people of all property until their children wake up homeless on the continent their father's conquered.
Thomas Jefferson
Thursday, March 20, 2008
Wednesday, March 19, 2008
Quote of the Day
I sincerely believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies. The issuing power should be taken from the banks and restored to the people, to whom it properly belongs.
Thomas Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson
Monday, March 17, 2008
Liberal Critics of the New Atheists
Keith Parsons expresses well my opinions of those on the left that criticize Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, etc. Here's a key quote:
"If religion were always as bad as they say, then it would deserve every bit of censure they dish out, and, without question, the world would be much, much better off if we were rid of it. If it is objectionable to say that all religion is bad, then it is objectionable because it is false, not because it is rude to say so. Hence, it will not do for Linker to perch on his high horse of sensitivity and castigate the “ideological” atheists for their supposedly bad attitude; he is going to actually have to deal with their arguments."
HT: John Loftus
"If religion were always as bad as they say, then it would deserve every bit of censure they dish out, and, without question, the world would be much, much better off if we were rid of it. If it is objectionable to say that all religion is bad, then it is objectionable because it is false, not because it is rude to say so. Hence, it will not do for Linker to perch on his high horse of sensitivity and castigate the “ideological” atheists for their supposedly bad attitude; he is going to actually have to deal with their arguments."
HT: John Loftus
Friday, March 7, 2008
Jon, shut the f&@k up!!
I'm a pain in the neck. I know that. The thing is I love to argue. I could seriously spend hour after hour arguing. Politics and religion are the best.
The problem is, who can I find that is willing to argue with me? Well, turns out it's usually going to be family. These are the people I'm closest to that I see the most often. But you need something to disagree about. When you're young and you just accept everything your parents say as default, it's hard to argue with them, because you agree too much. But you can find a few things.
When I was married I was a conservative Christian. It's the same thing my parents were, which is not all that unusual. My wife was also a conservative Christian, but not as die hard as me. But her side of the family had some people that were both political and religious liberals. Even an agnostic. This was beautiful. I was never happier than when I was in the presence of these liberals trying to goad them into getting into arguments with me. It was hog heaven.
What I'd often do is use a technique I had heard from Greg Koukl. He calls it "throwing out some chum." You basically say something that's pretty tame, but that might make the hearer think, or perhaps it's something the hearer would disagree with and would want to say something in reply. Once they do, you use that as a little lever to pry open an entire argument. They've taken the bait, and away you go.
But this was not hog heaven for my in-laws. This was more like hog hell. I knew this and tried as best as I could to walk a fine line. I wanted to argue with them, but I didn't want to upset them. It didn't always work. My wife's aunt (we'll call her Aunt M for discussion) was one such person that didn't care for my pastime. She's a very smart person. She has a PhD and is a professor at a major university. Well, the chum this time was a little dig at FDR. My wife's grandmother (political and religious liberal) took the bait, and away we went. It was me vs all as usual. I'm happy, but they're becoming enraged. The conversation culminated with this statement, from Aunt M. "Why don't you just shut the f&@k up!!"
Well, that's exactly what I did, as did everyone else in the room, none of whom are used to that sort of language. Nor are we used to hearing this language from my wife's aunt.
OK, so maybe I let things get out of hand. I backed off for the time being. That is, until we got together for the next family function. On another occasion I made a few comments that indicated I was a fan of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. I direct them mostly at Uncle D, who like me kind of enjoys a nice battle. Aunt M wants no part of this discussion, but she just can't muzzle her own irritation. Trying to contain herself she said something that sounds farily mild, but the tone made it clear that this was another "shut the f&@k up" monent. She said "You know Jon, you really are clueless. Seriously. You have no idea what you're talking about."
Well, it's been some time since those events, and something has occurred to me. Basically Aunt M was right. I was totally clueless. I was a young stupid guy that thought I had the whole world figured out. Not about the Swift Vets. I still love those guys, and think their claims were correct, though regardless I now think Kerry would have been a better president. The point being I was clueless in my overall neo-con way of thinking.
But how will I ever come to know that I'm clueless if I'm not arguing with people and gaining information in that way? Any remotely common opinion can be formidably defended. Anything. Take Islam. If you were raised in Pakistan you'd probably start life as a Muslim. You might bump into people that disagreed as you got older and you might buy books and listen to debates from Ahmed Deedat and you would be able to pummel your Christian or atheist acquantances.
If you just leave it at that you'll never learn anything. You'll sit there and consider yourself superior. But if you keep pushing and pushing you'll finally start to be exposed to real challenges, which can help you see the light. That's how it works with me. It's not that I like being a bully, though maybe I do take some pleasure in victory. But it's more that I like learning. I'm never more happy than when I've learned something new that helps me make better sense of the world.
So, sorry for being obnixious, Aunt M. But had I not been that obnoxious, argumentative jerk I would have never learned how clueless I was, and I would have never changed my opinions so that they are more in comformity with yours than ever before.
The problem is, who can I find that is willing to argue with me? Well, turns out it's usually going to be family. These are the people I'm closest to that I see the most often. But you need something to disagree about. When you're young and you just accept everything your parents say as default, it's hard to argue with them, because you agree too much. But you can find a few things.
When I was married I was a conservative Christian. It's the same thing my parents were, which is not all that unusual. My wife was also a conservative Christian, but not as die hard as me. But her side of the family had some people that were both political and religious liberals. Even an agnostic. This was beautiful. I was never happier than when I was in the presence of these liberals trying to goad them into getting into arguments with me. It was hog heaven.
What I'd often do is use a technique I had heard from Greg Koukl. He calls it "throwing out some chum." You basically say something that's pretty tame, but that might make the hearer think, or perhaps it's something the hearer would disagree with and would want to say something in reply. Once they do, you use that as a little lever to pry open an entire argument. They've taken the bait, and away you go.
But this was not hog heaven for my in-laws. This was more like hog hell. I knew this and tried as best as I could to walk a fine line. I wanted to argue with them, but I didn't want to upset them. It didn't always work. My wife's aunt (we'll call her Aunt M for discussion) was one such person that didn't care for my pastime. She's a very smart person. She has a PhD and is a professor at a major university. Well, the chum this time was a little dig at FDR. My wife's grandmother (political and religious liberal) took the bait, and away we went. It was me vs all as usual. I'm happy, but they're becoming enraged. The conversation culminated with this statement, from Aunt M. "Why don't you just shut the f&@k up!!"
Well, that's exactly what I did, as did everyone else in the room, none of whom are used to that sort of language. Nor are we used to hearing this language from my wife's aunt.
OK, so maybe I let things get out of hand. I backed off for the time being. That is, until we got together for the next family function. On another occasion I made a few comments that indicated I was a fan of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. I direct them mostly at Uncle D, who like me kind of enjoys a nice battle. Aunt M wants no part of this discussion, but she just can't muzzle her own irritation. Trying to contain herself she said something that sounds farily mild, but the tone made it clear that this was another "shut the f&@k up" monent. She said "You know Jon, you really are clueless. Seriously. You have no idea what you're talking about."
Well, it's been some time since those events, and something has occurred to me. Basically Aunt M was right. I was totally clueless. I was a young stupid guy that thought I had the whole world figured out. Not about the Swift Vets. I still love those guys, and think their claims were correct, though regardless I now think Kerry would have been a better president. The point being I was clueless in my overall neo-con way of thinking.
But how will I ever come to know that I'm clueless if I'm not arguing with people and gaining information in that way? Any remotely common opinion can be formidably defended. Anything. Take Islam. If you were raised in Pakistan you'd probably start life as a Muslim. You might bump into people that disagreed as you got older and you might buy books and listen to debates from Ahmed Deedat and you would be able to pummel your Christian or atheist acquantances.
If you just leave it at that you'll never learn anything. You'll sit there and consider yourself superior. But if you keep pushing and pushing you'll finally start to be exposed to real challenges, which can help you see the light. That's how it works with me. It's not that I like being a bully, though maybe I do take some pleasure in victory. But it's more that I like learning. I'm never more happy than when I've learned something new that helps me make better sense of the world.
So, sorry for being obnixious, Aunt M. But had I not been that obnoxious, argumentative jerk I would have never learned how clueless I was, and I would have never changed my opinions so that they are more in comformity with yours than ever before.
Tuesday, March 4, 2008
Diego Sanchez is Very Happy that Jesus Helped Him Smash David Bielkheden's Face In
Diego seems to think Jesus deserves the credit. Bielkheden is from Sweden, so he's probably an atheist anyway, which means naturally Jesus would be on Diego's side. Personally I think Diego is a very hard working guy and deserves the credit. He's a great fighter. But what do I know.
The Bible-God and Child Sacrifice
Wow. John Loftus has a couple of very interesting posts on child sacrifice here and here. Is this right? I've had my suspicions, but I've never been sure. Sometimes the text is a little ambiguous. Here's one example.
Exodus 22:29 “You shall not delay to offer from the fullness of your harvest and from the outflow of your presses. The first-born of your sons you shall give to me. 30 You shall do likewise with your oxen and with your sheep: seven days it shall be with its dam; on the eighth day you shall give it to me."
Does this mean these firstborn are "set apart" or offered as burnt offerings. In light of the other information at the links above it seems very plausible to think this means burnt offerings. Worth looking into.
Exodus 22:29 “You shall not delay to offer from the fullness of your harvest and from the outflow of your presses. The first-born of your sons you shall give to me. 30 You shall do likewise with your oxen and with your sheep: seven days it shall be with its dam; on the eighth day you shall give it to me."
Does this mean these firstborn are "set apart" or offered as burnt offerings. In light of the other information at the links above it seems very plausible to think this means burnt offerings. Worth looking into.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
William Lane Craig and Kettle Logic, Part 2
During his debate with William Lane Craig, Bart Ehrman was discussing whether it is possible for a historian to affirm a miracle. Here is what he said:
Historians can only establish what probably happened in the past, and by definition a miracle is the least probable occurrence. And so, by the very nature of the canons of historical research, we can’t claim historically that a miracle probably happened. By definition, it probably didn’t. And history can only establish what probably did.
Craig was expecting this statement apparently and had alluded to it in his opening statement. In his first rebuttal he replied:
Dr. Ehrman maintains that we can never say that a miracle like the resurrection probably occurred because miracles by their very nature are inherently improbable. Now despite what he said, this argument is nothing new. It was already propounded in the 18th century by David Hume in his essay “Of Miracles.” Dr. Ehrman’s argument is just a warmed-over version of Hume’s reasoning.
The first thing I want to say is as far as I know this is not Hume's argument. Hume didn't argue that miracles were unknowable. Here is what Hume said:
No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish... When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider... whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other... and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates-then, and not until then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.[Hume, "of Miracles"]
According to Hume a miracle is known if its falsehood is more miraculous than the fact that it endeavors to establish. Miracles are knowable.
This statement is a great expression of how a miraculous claim would apply to Bayes' Theorem. Bayes' Theorem is a mathematical expression that can be used to help a person understand whether or not they ought to believe a certain proposition. It produces a number between 0 and 1 representing the probability that a given proposition ought to be believed based upon your own subjective assessments.
It is explained by my brother here, and applied to the resurrection by my brother here, here, and here. Two important terms in the expression are terms which represent the initial probability of a claim and also a term which represents how well alternative explanations fit the evidence.
What Hume is saying basically is that a miracle carries a strong presumption against it. Extremely strong. So to affirm a miracle it would have to be the case that alternative explanations would have to fit the data EXTREMELY poorly. Not just poorly, but EXTREMELY poorly. In other words, the "initial probability" term in Bayes' Theorem is extremely low. To affirm a miracle the term that represents how well the alternative explanations fit the data must also be extremely low. It would have to be about as low as the initial probability term.
So back to the debate between Craig and Ehrman, Craig rolled out Bayes' Theorem and made this point, and explained it all under the heading "Ehrman's Egregious Error". It was a bit of a stunt, and it probably played well to the audience. Bayes' Theorem looks like complicated math, so likely few knew what was being said. Ehrman wasn't prepared to respond to it because he probably didn't even really know what was being said. Craig made the point that if the term that represents how well the alternative explanations fit the data were low enough, then you could conclude that a miracle had occurred.
Technically I think Craig is right. In theory it is possible to know a miracle, and Bayes' Theorem shows this. But for practical purposes Ehrman is right. To say that we can't know a miracle by definition is going too far. But as far as the historian is concerned in the real world you can't know a miracle. You don't control the conditions by which you attain knowledge well enough to have confidence in a miraculous claim. The alternative explanation term in Bayes' Theorem may be low, but it is never low enough to conclude that a miracle occurred. The expression "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" is another way of stating Bayes' Theorem, and as applied to a miracle you recognize that the evidence for claims of the miraculous are never good enough.
So this is where Craig's kettle logic once again manifests itself. Bayes' Thoerem does show that you can't go so far as to say that it is logically impossible to know a miracle. But Bayes' Theorem also makes it clear that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Craig doesn't like this conclusion because he knows it is devastating to his position.
So during the question and answer period Craig was confronted with this issue. He was asked to actually use Bayes' Theorem, which is the equation he used to rebut Ehrman, and apply it to the resurrection. Now, this is not a path Craig wants to travel on. He is going to want to avoid inserting real numbers because in conceding the usefulness of Bayes' Theorem he would be forced to admit that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. But if Bayes' Theorem is valid in rebuttal to Ehrman, how can it not be valid for Craig? Here is how Craig goes about avoiding the issue:
Question for Dr. Craig: I am very interested in the probability equation you gave. To say it’s probable that Jesus was resurrected, you must put numbers into that equation and get a answer greater than 0.5. I am very interested in what the actual number was and the margin of error for it. And how were the numbers for it determined?
Answer from Dr. Craig: Thank you for that question! Richard Swinburne, who’s a professor at Oxford University, has written a book on incarnation and resurrection in which he actually uses the probability calculus that I have just given. He comes up with an estimate of 0.97 for the resurrection of Jesus in terms of its probability, and you can look at his book for that. I myself don’t use the probability calculus in arguing for resurrection of Jesus. The reason I brought it up is because of the response to the Humean sort of argument that Dr. Ehrman was offering, which I think is completely misconceived because he tries to say that the resurrection is improbable simply because of the improbability of the resurrection on the background information alone. In fact, I think that that probability is inscrutable, given that we’re dealing with a free agent. I don’t see how we can assess or assign specific numbers for those.
When Bayes' Theorem can be used to expose another person's error, then it's a great tool. But in the case where it would also expose Craig's error, suddenly these things are "inscrutable" and Bayes' Theorem isn't useful. But if it is impossible to know what numbers should be involved, then how can we know that Ehrman is wrong when he says miracles are unknowable? If these things are impossible to assess, then the term which Craig says could in theory be low enough to allow knowledge of a miracle can never be known to be low enough. Craig wants to have his cake and eat it too.
Historians can only establish what probably happened in the past, and by definition a miracle is the least probable occurrence. And so, by the very nature of the canons of historical research, we can’t claim historically that a miracle probably happened. By definition, it probably didn’t. And history can only establish what probably did.
Craig was expecting this statement apparently and had alluded to it in his opening statement. In his first rebuttal he replied:
Dr. Ehrman maintains that we can never say that a miracle like the resurrection probably occurred because miracles by their very nature are inherently improbable. Now despite what he said, this argument is nothing new. It was already propounded in the 18th century by David Hume in his essay “Of Miracles.” Dr. Ehrman’s argument is just a warmed-over version of Hume’s reasoning.
The first thing I want to say is as far as I know this is not Hume's argument. Hume didn't argue that miracles were unknowable. Here is what Hume said:
No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish... When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider... whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other... and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates-then, and not until then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.[Hume, "of Miracles"]
According to Hume a miracle is known if its falsehood is more miraculous than the fact that it endeavors to establish. Miracles are knowable.
This statement is a great expression of how a miraculous claim would apply to Bayes' Theorem. Bayes' Theorem is a mathematical expression that can be used to help a person understand whether or not they ought to believe a certain proposition. It produces a number between 0 and 1 representing the probability that a given proposition ought to be believed based upon your own subjective assessments.
It is explained by my brother here, and applied to the resurrection by my brother here, here, and here. Two important terms in the expression are terms which represent the initial probability of a claim and also a term which represents how well alternative explanations fit the evidence.
What Hume is saying basically is that a miracle carries a strong presumption against it. Extremely strong. So to affirm a miracle it would have to be the case that alternative explanations would have to fit the data EXTREMELY poorly. Not just poorly, but EXTREMELY poorly. In other words, the "initial probability" term in Bayes' Theorem is extremely low. To affirm a miracle the term that represents how well the alternative explanations fit the data must also be extremely low. It would have to be about as low as the initial probability term.
So back to the debate between Craig and Ehrman, Craig rolled out Bayes' Theorem and made this point, and explained it all under the heading "Ehrman's Egregious Error". It was a bit of a stunt, and it probably played well to the audience. Bayes' Theorem looks like complicated math, so likely few knew what was being said. Ehrman wasn't prepared to respond to it because he probably didn't even really know what was being said. Craig made the point that if the term that represents how well the alternative explanations fit the data were low enough, then you could conclude that a miracle had occurred.
Technically I think Craig is right. In theory it is possible to know a miracle, and Bayes' Theorem shows this. But for practical purposes Ehrman is right. To say that we can't know a miracle by definition is going too far. But as far as the historian is concerned in the real world you can't know a miracle. You don't control the conditions by which you attain knowledge well enough to have confidence in a miraculous claim. The alternative explanation term in Bayes' Theorem may be low, but it is never low enough to conclude that a miracle occurred. The expression "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" is another way of stating Bayes' Theorem, and as applied to a miracle you recognize that the evidence for claims of the miraculous are never good enough.
So this is where Craig's kettle logic once again manifests itself. Bayes' Thoerem does show that you can't go so far as to say that it is logically impossible to know a miracle. But Bayes' Theorem also makes it clear that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Craig doesn't like this conclusion because he knows it is devastating to his position.
So during the question and answer period Craig was confronted with this issue. He was asked to actually use Bayes' Theorem, which is the equation he used to rebut Ehrman, and apply it to the resurrection. Now, this is not a path Craig wants to travel on. He is going to want to avoid inserting real numbers because in conceding the usefulness of Bayes' Theorem he would be forced to admit that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. But if Bayes' Theorem is valid in rebuttal to Ehrman, how can it not be valid for Craig? Here is how Craig goes about avoiding the issue:
Question for Dr. Craig: I am very interested in the probability equation you gave. To say it’s probable that Jesus was resurrected, you must put numbers into that equation and get a answer greater than 0.5. I am very interested in what the actual number was and the margin of error for it. And how were the numbers for it determined?
Answer from Dr. Craig: Thank you for that question! Richard Swinburne, who’s a professor at Oxford University, has written a book on incarnation and resurrection in which he actually uses the probability calculus that I have just given. He comes up with an estimate of 0.97 for the resurrection of Jesus in terms of its probability, and you can look at his book for that. I myself don’t use the probability calculus in arguing for resurrection of Jesus. The reason I brought it up is because of the response to the Humean sort of argument that Dr. Ehrman was offering, which I think is completely misconceived because he tries to say that the resurrection is improbable simply because of the improbability of the resurrection on the background information alone. In fact, I think that that probability is inscrutable, given that we’re dealing with a free agent. I don’t see how we can assess or assign specific numbers for those.
When Bayes' Theorem can be used to expose another person's error, then it's a great tool. But in the case where it would also expose Craig's error, suddenly these things are "inscrutable" and Bayes' Theorem isn't useful. But if it is impossible to know what numbers should be involved, then how can we know that Ehrman is wrong when he says miracles are unknowable? If these things are impossible to assess, then the term which Craig says could in theory be low enough to allow knowledge of a miracle can never be known to be low enough. Craig wants to have his cake and eat it too.
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